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Abstract
In identity-based encryption (IBE) systems, an efficient key delegation method to manage a large
number of users and an efficient key revocation method to handle the dynamic credentials of users are
needed. Revocable hierarchical IBE (RHIBE) can provide these two methods by organizing the identities
of users as a hierarchy and broadcasting an update key for non-revoked users per each time period. To
provide the key revocation functionality, previous RHIBE schemes use a tree-based revocation scheme.
However, this approach has an inherent limitation such that the number of update key elements depends
on the number of revoked users. In this paper, we propose two new RHIBE schemes in multilinear maps
that use the public-key broadcast encryption scheme instead of using the tree-based revocation scheme
to overcome the mentioned limitation. In our first RHIBE scheme, the number of private key elements
and update key elements is reduced to O(ℓ) and O(ℓ) respectively where ℓ is the depth of a hierarchical
identity. In our second RHIBE scheme, we can further reduce the number of private key elements from
O(ℓ) to O(1).
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1 Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a specific type of public-key encryption (PKE) that uses an identity
string of a user (e.g., e-mail address, phone number) as a public key to simplify the management of public
keys [5, 28]. IBE can be extended to hierarchical IBE (HIBE) that supports the delegation of private keys
by allowing a parent user to generate private keys of child users [14, 15]. For the deployment of IBE (or
HIBE) in real environments, an efficient revocation mechanism is needed to handle dynamically changing
credentials (private keys) of users. Revocable HIBE (RHIBE) is an extension of HIBE that provides both the
delegation of private keys and the revocation of private keys. Although there already exists a revocable IBE
(RIBE) scheme [2], it is not easy to directly apply the technique of RIBE to RHIBE since the key delegation
of HIBE makes it hard to handle the revocation.
The first RHIBE scheme was proposed by Seo and Emura [25] that uses a tree-based revocation scheme
of Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [21] for the revocation functionality. To create an update key in this RHIBE
scheme, a user who has a private key should retrieve all update keys of all ancestors. This method is called
as history-preserving updates. After that, Seo and Emura proposed another RHIBE scheme via history-free
updates [27]. In this RHIBE scheme via history-free updates, a user can simply create an update key after
retrieving the update key of his parent only. By using this new approach, they also reduced the size of a
private key from O(ℓ2 log N) to O(ℓ logN) where ℓ is the depth of the identity and N is the maximum number
of users in each level. Recently, Lee and Park proposed new RHIBE schemes with shorter private keys and
update keys by removing the undesirable multiplicative factor ℓ from the size of private keys and update
keys [18].
Although the progress of RHIBE is impressive, the size of a private key and an update key in previous
RHIBE schemes still depends on the size of a private key and a ciphertext in the tree-based revocation
scheme. Recently, Park, Lee, and Lee [22] proposed a new RIBE scheme with short keys from multilinear
maps by using the public-key broadcast encryption (PKBE) scheme of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [6] for
the key revocation. Their new technique enables for RIBE to have a constant number of private key elements
and update key elements. Therefore, we ask the following question in this paper: “Can we also reduce the
size of keys further in RHIBE by using the PKBE scheme for the key revocation?”
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we propose two RHIBE schemes from multilinear maps1 with shorter private key elements
and shorter update key elements. The followings are our results:
RHIBE via History-Preserving Updates. We first construct an RHIBE scheme via history-preserving
updates from three-leveled multilinear maps by combining the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen (BB-
HIBE) [3] and the PKBE scheme of Boneh, Gentry and Waters (BGW-PKBE) [6]. We also prove its security
in the selective revocation model under the multilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (MDHE) assumption. In
this RHIBE scheme, the number of group elements in a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext is O(ℓ),
O(ℓ), and O(ℓ) respectively where ℓ is the maximum number of hierarchy identity. Note that the number
of private key elements and update key elements in our RHIBE scheme only depends on the depth of a
hierarchy identity.
RHIBE via History-Free Updates. Next, we present another RHIBE scheme via history-free updates from
three-leveled multilinear maps with a constant number of private key elements. This RHIBE scheme is
1Note that many candidate multilinear maps are currently broken [9, 10], but the multilinear map from indistinguishability
obfuscation is still alive [1].
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Table 1: Comparison of revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes
Scheme PP Size SK Size UK Size Model Maps Assumption
SE [25] O(ℓ) O(ℓ2 logN) O(ℓr log N
r
) SE-IND BLM DBDH
SE (CS) [27] O(ℓ) O(ℓ logN) O(ℓr log N
r
) SE-IND BLM q-Type
SE (SD) [27] O(ℓ) O(ℓ log2 N) O(ℓr) SRL-IND BLM q-Type
LP (CS) [18] O(1) O(logN) O(ℓ+ r log N
r
) SE-IND BLM q-Type
LP (SD) [18] O(1) O(log2 N) O(ℓ+ r) SRL-IND BLM q-Type
Ours O(N +λ ℓ) O(ℓ) O(ℓ) SRL-IND MLM MDHE
Ours O(N +λ ℓ) O(1) O(ℓ) SRL-IND MLM MDHE
Let λ be a security parameter, ℓ be the maximum hierarchical level, N be the maximum number of users, and r
be the number of revoked users. Sizes for public parameters (PP), private keys (SK), and update keys (UK) count
group elements. BLM stands for bilinear maps and MLM stands for multilinear maps.
also secure in the selective revocation list model under the MDHE assumption. In this RHIBE scheme,
the number of group elements in a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext is O(1), O(ℓ), and O(ℓ)
respectively. Compared with our first RHIBE scheme that has O(ℓ) group elements in a private key, our
second RHIBE scheme just has O(1) group elements in a private key. The detailed comparison of RHIBE
schemes is given in Table 1.
1.2 Our Techniques
To construct RHIBE schemes with shorter keys from multilinear maps, we basically follow the design tech-
nique of Park, Lee, and Lee [22] that uses the BGW-PKBE scheme [6] instead of the tree-based revocation
system of Naor et al. [21]. However, the naive employment of this technique does not work since the del-
egation of private keys should be considered. To solve this problem, we devise new techniques for RHIBE
in multilinear maps. We briefly review the RIBE scheme of Park, Lee, and Lee [22] and then overview our
two-level RHIBE scheme for a simple exposition.
If we simply follow the design strategy of Park et al. [22], a trusted center which has a master key βε ,γε
creates a private key for a 1-level identity ID1 = (I1) as SKID1 =
(
gα
d1 γε
1 F1,1(I1)
−r1,1,g−r1,11
)
and broadcasts
a 0-level update key for time T and a revoked set Rε as UKT,Rε =
(
gβε1 ,(g
γε
1 ∏ j∈SIε gα
N+1− j
1 )
βε H1(T )r2 ,g−r21
)
where di is an index assigned to ID1 and SIε is the set of receiver indexes. Note that SKID1 is tied to the private
key of PKBE and UKT,Rε is tied to the ciphertext header of PKBE. After that, the 1-level user of the identity
ID1 can delegate his private key to a 2-level user with an identity ID2 = (I1, I2) by creating a 2-level private
key as SKID2 =
(
{gα
d1 γε
1 F1,1(I1)
−r1,1,g−r1,11 }, {g
αd2 γID1
1 F1,2(I2)
−r1,2 ,g−r1,21 }
)
. Next, the 1-level user broadcasts
a 1-level update key for time T and a revoked set RID1 as UKT,RID1 =
(
{(gγε1 ∏ j∈SIε gα
N+1− j
1 )
βε H1(T )r2,1 ,g
−r2,1
1 },
{(gγID11 ∏ j∈SIID1 g
αN+1− j
1 )
βID1 H1(T )r2,2 ,g
−r2,2
1 }
)
. If (I1) 6∈ Rε and (I1, I2) 6∈ RID1 , then the 2-level user of the
identity ID2 =(I1, I2) can derive a decryption key DKID2,T =
(
gα
N+1(βε+βID1 )
2 ∏2i=1 F2,i(Ii)r1,iH1(T )r2 ,g
r1,1
2 ,g
r1,2
2 ,
gr22
)
by performing paring operations.
However, there are some problems in the above approach. The first problem is that the 2-level user can
extract the private key of the 1-level user from his private key since SKID1 is contained in SKID2 . The second
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problem is that the master key part gα
N+1(βε+βID1)
1 of the decryption key DKID2,T is wrongly structured since a
random value βID1 that is hidden to a sender is used. To overcome these problems, we devise a new random
blinding technique for RHIBE that safely blinds a private key in delegation and cancels unnecessary random
values in decryption. In this technique, the private key component gα
dγε
1 F1,1(I1)
−r1,1 of SKID1 is multiplied by
a random element g−r0,21 and a new element g
αN+1βID1
2 g
βε r0,2
2 is included in the private key delegation process.
This newly added element enables to cancel the random values r0,2 and βID1 in the decryption key derivation
process. Note that a 2-level user who is not revoked in RID1 only can derive a correct decryption key which
has a master key gα
N+1βε
2 by cancelling the random values. Furthermore, if we encode the identity of a user
carefully, we can reduce the size of private key elements from O(ℓ2) to O(ℓ) where ℓ is the hierarchical
depth of the identity. Therefore, we can build an RHIBE scheme via the history-preserving updates [25] in
which a private key and an update key include all private keys and update keys of lower level users from
3-leveled multilinear maps.
To achieve an RHIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements, we apply the history-
free updates approach of Seo and Emura [27]. Let SKID1 be the 1-level private key for ID1, UKT,Rε be the
0-level update key, and DKID1,T be the 1-level decryption key as the same as our first RHIBE scheme. By
following this approach, the 1-level user with an identity ID1 = (I1) simply creates a 2-level private key
for ID2 = (I1, I2) as SKID2 = (g
αd2 γID1
1 F1,2(I2)
−r1,2 ,g−r1,21 ). Next, he creates a 1-level update key UKT,RID1
by using his decryption key DKID1,T instead of using the 0-level update key UKT,Rε . In this step, we
use the random blinding technique to prevent a collusion attack. That is, the decryption key component
gα
N+1βε
2 F2,1(I1)
−r1,1H2(T )r0 is safely blinded by a random element g
−αN+1βID1
2 . Then, the 1-level update key
is formed as UKT,RID1 =
(
{gα
N+1βε
2 g
−αN+1βID1
2 F1,1(I1)
−r1,1H2(T )r0 ,gr12 ,g
r0
2 }, {g
βID1
1 ,(g
γID1
1 ∏ j∈SIID1 g
αN+1− j
1 )
βID1
H1(T )r2 ,g−r21 }
)
. Note that this random blinding element is removed in the decryption key derivation process.
Therefore, we have an RHIBE scheme with shorter private keys.
1.3 Related Work
The concept of IBE was introduced by Shamir to solve the certificate management problem in PKE [28].
After the first realization of an IBE scheme in bilinear maps by Boneh and Franklin [5], many IBE schemes
in bilinear maps were proposed [3, 12, 29, 30]. As mentioned before, providing an efficient revocation
mechanism for IBE is a very important issue. Boneh and Franklin introduced a simple revocation method
for IBE by concatenating an identity ID with time T [5]. However, this method is not scalable since a
trusted center periodically generates a private key for each user on each time period. The first scalable RIBE
scheme was proposed by Boldyreva, Goyal, and Kumar [2] by combining the Fuzzy IBE scheme of Sahai
and Waters [24] and the complete subtree (CS) scheme of Naor et al. [21]. Many other RIBE schemes
also followed this design technique [20, 26]. A different RIBE scheme that uses the subset difference (SD)
scheme instead of using the CS scheme proposed by Lee et al. [16]. Recently, Park, Lee, and Lee proposed
a new RIBE scheme from multilinear maps that has a constant number of private key elements and update
key elements [22].
As mentioned before, the notion of IBE can be extended to HIBE where a trusted center can delegate
the generation of private keys to other users. After the introduction of HIBE [15], many HIBE scheme
with different properties were proposed [3, 4, 8, 13, 14, 17, 19, 30]. The first RHIBE scheme was presented
by Seo and Emura [25] that combines the BB-HIBE scheme and the CS scheme. To reduce the size of
private keys in the first RHIBE scheme, Seo and Emura proposed another RHIBE scheme via history-free
update method that combines the BBG-HIBE scheme and the CS (or SD) scheme [27]. In previous RHIBE
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schemes, the maximum hierarchy depth should be fixed in the setup phase. To overcome this limitation,
Ryu et al. proposed an unbounded RHIBE scheme by using an unbounded HIBE scheme [23]. Recently,
Lee and Park proposed an RHIBE scheme with shorter private keys and update keys [18]. To reduce the size
of private keys and update keys, they first presented a new HIBE scheme that supports a short intermediate
private key and build an RHIBE scheme in a modular way.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review multilinear maps and complexity assumptions in multilinear maps.
2.1 Notation
Let λ be a security parameter and [n] be the set {1, . . . ,n} for n ∈ Z. Let I be the identity space. A
hierarchical identity ID with a depth k is defined as an identity vector ID = (I1, . . . , Ik) ∈ Ik. We let ID| j
be a vector (I1, . . . , I j) of size j derived from ID. If ID = (I1, . . . , Ik), then we have ID = ID|k. We define
ID|0 = ε for simplicity. A function Prefix(ID|k) returns a set of prefix vectors {ID| j} where 1 ≤ j ≤ k
where ID|k = (I1, . . . , Ik) ∈ Ik for some k. For two hierarchical identities ID|i and ID| j with i < j, ID|i is an
ancestor identity of ID| j and ID| j is a descendant identity of ID|i if ID|i ∈ Prefix(ID| j).
2.2 Leveled Multilinear Maps
We define generic leveled multilinear maps that are the leveled version of the cryptographic multilinear
maps introduced by Boneh and Silverberg [7]. We follow the definition of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [11].
Definition 2.1 (Leveled Multilinear Maps). We assume the existence of a group generator G, which takes
as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer k. Let ~G = (G1, . . . ,Gk) be a sequence of groups of
large prime order p > 2λ . In addition, we let gi be a canonical generator of Gi respectively. We assume
the existence of a set of bilinear maps {ei, j : Gi ×G j → Gi+ j|i, j ≥ 1; i+ j ≤ k} that have the following
properties:
• Bilinearity: The map ei, j satisfies the following relation: ei, j(gai ,gbj) = gabi+ j : ∀a,b ∈ Zp
• Non-degeneracy: We have that ei, j(gi,g j) = gi+ j for each valid i, j.
We say that ~G is a multilinear group if the group operations in ~G as well as all bilinear maps are efficiently
computable. We often omit the subscripts of ei, j and just write e.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
We introduce complexity assumptions in multilinear maps. This assumption is the multilinear version of the
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [6].
Assumption 1 (Multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent, (k,N)-MDHE). Let (p,~G,{ei, j |i, j ≥ 1; i+ j ≤ k})
be the description of a k-leveled multilinear group of order p. Let gi be a generator of Gi. The decisional
(k,N)-MDHE assumption is that if the challenge tuple
D =
(
g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
c1
1 , . . . ,g
ck−1
1
)
and Z
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are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z0 = g
aN+1 ∏k−1i=1 ci
k from a random element Z = Z1 ∈Gk with
more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv(k,N)-MDHE
A
(1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[A(D,Z0) =
0]−Pr[A(D,Z1) = 0]
∣∣ where the probability is taken over random choices of a,c1, . . . ,ck−1 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 2 (Three-Leveled Multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent, (3,N)-MDHE). Let (p,~G,e1,1,e1,2,e2,1)
be the description of a three-leveled multilinear group of order p. Let gi be a generator of Gi. The decisional
(3,N)-MDHE assumption is that if the challenge tuple
D =
(
g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1,g
c
1
)
and Z
are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z0 = ga
N+1bc
3 from a random element Z = Z1 ∈ G3 with
more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv(3,N)-MDHE
A
(1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[A(D,Z0) =
0]−Pr[A(D,Z1) = 0]
∣∣ where the probability is taken over random choices of a,b,c ∈ Zp.
3 Revocable HIBE with History-Preserving Updates
In this section, we first define the syntax and the security of RHIBE. Next, we propose an RHIBE scheme
with history-preserving updates from three-leveled multilinear maps and prove its selective security.
3.1 Definition
Revocable HIBE (RHIBE) is an extension of IBE that provides both the delegation of private keys and the
revocation of private keys [25]. In RHIBE, a user who has a private key SKID for a hierarchical identity ID=
(I1, . . . , Iℓ−1) can generate a (long-term) private key SKID′ for a child user with the identity ID′ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ)
where ID ∈ Prefix(ID′). The user with ID also periodically broadcasts an update key UKT,RID for the set
RID of revoked child users at a time period T . If the child user with ID′ who has a private key SKID′ is not
included in the revoked set RID, then he can derive a (short-term) decryption key DKID′,T from SKID′ and
UKT,RID′ . A sender creates a ciphertext CTID′,T that encrypts a message M for a receiver identity ID
′ and a
time period T , and then the receiver who has a decryption key DKID′,T can obtain the message by decrypting
the ciphertext CTID′,T . The syntax of RHIBE is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Revocable HIBE). A revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme that is associated with the iden-
tity space I , the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms Setup, GenKey,
UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ,N,L): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ , the maximum number N of
users in each depth, and the maximum depth L of the identity. It outputs a master key MK, a revocation
list RLε , a state STε , and public parameters PP.
GenKey(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The private key generation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical
identity ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) ∈ Iℓ, a private key SKID|ℓ−1 , the state STID|ℓ−1 , and public parameters PP. It
outputs a private key SKID|ℓ for ID|ℓ and updates STID|ℓ−1 .
UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1 ,UKT,RID|ℓ−2 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The update key generation algorithm takes as input up-
date time T ∈ T , a revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 , an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−2 , the state STID|ℓ−1 , and the public
parameters PP. It outputs an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 for T and RID|ℓ−1 where RID|ℓ−1 is the set of
revoked identities at the time T .
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DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The decryption key derivation algorithm takes as input a private key
SKID|ℓ , an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a decryption key DKID|ℓ,T
or ⊥.
Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP): The encryption algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ=(I1, . . . , Iℓ)∈
I , time T , a message M ∈M, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T for ID|ℓ
and T .
Decrypt(CTID|ℓ ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP): The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T , a decryp-
tion key DKID′|ℓ,T ′ , and the public parameters PP. It outputs an encrypted message M or ⊥.
Revoke(ID|ℓ,T,RLID|ℓ−1,STID|ℓ−1 ): The revocation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ and
revocation time T , a revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 , and a state STID|ℓ−1 . It updates the revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 .
The correctness property of RHIBE is defined as follows: For all PP generated by Setup(1λ ,N,L), SKID|ℓ
generated by GenKey(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP) for any ID|ℓ, UKT,RID|ℓ−1 generated by UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1,
UKT,RID|ℓ−2 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP) for any T and RLID|ℓ−1 , CTID|ℓ,T generated by Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP) for any ID|ℓ,
T , and M, it is required that
• If (ID|ℓ /∈ RID|ℓ−1), then DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP) = DKID|ℓ,T .
• If (ID|ℓ ∈ RID|ℓ−1), then DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
• If (ID|ℓ = ID′|ℓ)∧ (T = T ′), then Decrypt(CTID|ℓ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP) = M.
• If (ID|ℓ 6= ID′|ℓ)∨ (T 6= T ′), then Decrypt(CTID|ℓ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP) =⊥ with all but negligible proba-
bility.
The security model of RHIBE with history-preserving updates was defined by Seo and Emura [25].
For the security proof our RHIBE scheme, we define a selective revocation list model where an adversary
initially submits the set of revoked identities. This weaker model was introduced by Boldyreva, et al. [2] and
used in other schemes [16,22,27]. In this paper, we follow the selective revocation list model refined by Seo
and Emura [27]. In this security model of RHIBE, an adversary initially submits a challenge identity ID∗|ℓ∗ ,
challenge time T ∗, and a revoked identity set R∗ at the time T ∗. After receiving public parameters PP,
the adversary can adaptively request private keys, update keys, decryption keys, and revocations with some
restrictions. In the challenge step, the adversary submits challenge messages M∗0 ,M∗1 and the challenger
creates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ that encrypts one of the challenge messages. The adversary continually
requests private keys, update keys, and decryption keys. Finally, if the adversary correctly guesses the
encrypted message, then he wins the game. The details of the security model is described as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Selective Revocation List Security, SRL-IND). The SRL-IND security of RHIBE is defined
in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID∗|ℓ∗ ∈ Iℓ
∗
, challenge time T ∗ ∈ T , and a revoked
identity set R∗ ⊆ Iℓ at the time T ∗.
2. Setup: C generates a master key MK, a revocation list RLε , a state STε , and public parameters PP by
running Setup(1λ ,N,L). It keeps MK,RLε ,STε to itself and gives PP to A.
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3. Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of queries. These queries are processed as
follows:
• Private key: If this is a private key query for a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ, then it gives the private
key SKID|ℓ to A by running GenKey(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP) with the restriction: If ID|ℓ is a
prefix of ID∗|ℓ∗ where ℓ≤ ℓ∗, then the revocation query for ID|ℓ or one of its ancestors must be
queried at some time T where T ≤ T ∗.
• Update key: If this is an update key query for a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ−1 and time T , then it
gives the update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 toA by running UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1,UKT,RID|ℓ−2 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP)
with the restriction: If T = T ∗, then the revoked identity set of RLID|ℓ−1 at the time T ∗ should be
equal to a revoked identity set derived from R∗.
• Decryption key: If this is a decryption key query for a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ and time T ,
then it gives the decryption key DKID|ℓ,T to A by running DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP)
with the restriction: The decryption key query for ID∗|ℓ∗ and T ∗ cannot be queried.
• Revocation: If this is a revocation query for a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ and revocation time
T , then it updates the revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 by running Revoke(ID|ℓ,T,RLID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1) with
the restriction: The revocation query for time T cannot be queried if the update key query for
the time T was already requested.
Note that A is allowed to request the update key query and the revocation query in non-decreasing
order of time, and an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 implicitly includes a revoked identity set RID|ℓ−1 derived
from RLID|ℓ−1 .
4. Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M∗0 ,M∗1 ∈M with equal length. C flips a random coin
b ∈ {0,1} and gives the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ to A by running Encrypt(ID∗|ℓ∗ ,T ∗,M∗b ,PP).
5. Phase 2: Amay continue to request a polynomial number of private keys, update keys, and decryption
keys subject to the same restrictions as before.
6. Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0,1}, and wins the game if b = b′.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvSRL-INDRHIBE,A(1λ ) =
∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣ where the probability is taken over all
the randomness of the experiment. An RHIBE scheme is SRL-IND secure if for all PPT adversary A, the
advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter λ .
3.2 Building Blocks
Let I = {0,1}l1 be the identity space and T = {0,1}l2 be the time space where l1 = 2λ and l2 = λ for
a security parameter λ . Let ID = (I1, . . . , Ik) be an hierarchical identity. We define EncodeCID(ID) as a
function that takes as input ID = (I1, . . . , Ik) and outputs a concatenated identity CID = (CI1, . . . ,CIk) where
CI j = H(I1‖· · ·‖I j), ‖ denotes the concatenation of two strings, and H is a collision-resistant hash function.
This encoding function has an interesting property such that if ID 6∈ Prefix(ID′) then CIk 6=CI′i for all i ∈ [k]
except with negligible probability [18].
We describe a modified HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [3] that additionally takes a time period in
multilinear groups. Note that we define the key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) version of HIBE.
HIBE.Setup(GDSMLM,L): Let GDSMLM = (p,~G = (G1,G2,G3),{ei, j},g1,g2,g3) be the description of a
multilinear group and L be the maximum depth of the hierarchical identity.
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1. It first selects random elements { f1,i,0}1≤i≤L,{ f1,i, j,b}1≤i≤L,1≤ j≤l1,b∈{0,1} ∈ G1. It also selects
random h1,0,{h1, j,b}1≤ j≤l2,b∈{0,1} ∈ G1. Let ~fk,i =
( fk,i,0,{ fk,i, j,b}
)
and~hk =
(
hk,0,{hk, j,b}
)
for
a multi-linear level k. Note that {~f2,i}1≤i≤L and~h2 can be obtained from {~f1,i}1≤i≤L and~h1 by
performing pairing operations.
2. Next, it defines Fk,i(CI) = fk,i,0 ∏l1j=1 fk,i, j,CI[ j] and Hk(T ) = hk,0 ∏l2j=1 hk,i, j,T [ j] where CI[ j] is a
bit value at the position j and T [ j] is a bit value at the position j.
3. It selects a random exponent α ∈ Zp and outputs a master key MK = α and public parameters
PP =
(
GDSMLM , {~f1,i}1≤i≤L, ~h1, Λ = gα3
)
.
HIBE.GenKey(ID|ℓ,T,MK,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) ∈ Iℓ, T ∈ T , and MK = α . It obtains CID|ℓ =
(CI1, . . . ,CIℓ) by calling EncodeCID(ID|ℓ). It selects random exponents r1, . . . ,rℓ,rL+1 ∈ Zp and
outputs a private key
SKID|ℓ,T =
(
D0 = gα2
ℓ
∏
i=1
F2,i(CIi)ri ·H2(T )rL+1 ,
{
Di = g−ri2
}ℓ
i=1, DL+1 = g
−rL+1
2
)
∈Gℓ+22 .
HIBE.RandKey(SKID|ℓ,T ,PP): Let SKID|ℓ,T = (D′0, . . . ,D′ℓ,D′L+1) and ID = (I1, . . . , Iℓ). It selects random
exponents r1, . . . ,rℓ,rL+1 ∈Zp and outputs a randomized private key SKID|ℓ,T =
(
D0 =D′0 ·∏ℓi=1 F2,i(CI1)ri ·
H2(T )rL+1 ,
{
Di = D′i ·g
−ri
2
}ℓ
i=1, DL+1 = D
′
L+1 ·g
−rL+1
2
)
.
HIBE.Delegate(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1,T ,PP): Let SKID|ℓ−1 = (D′0, . . . ,D′ℓ) and ID|ℓ= (I1, . . . , Iℓ). It obtains CID|ℓ =
(CI1, . . . ,CIℓ) by calling EncodeCID(ID|ℓ). It selects random a exponent rℓ ∈ Zp and creates a tem-
poral private key T SKID|ℓ,T =
(
D0 = D′0 ·F2,ℓ(CIℓ)rℓ ,
{
Di = D′i
}ℓ−1
i=1 , Dℓ = g
−rℓ
2 , DL+1 = D
′
L+1
)
. Next,
it outputs a delegated private key SKID|ℓ,T by running HIBE.RandKey(T SKID|ℓ,T ,PP).
HIBE.Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,s,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) and s is a random exponent in Zp. It obtains CID|ℓ =
(CI1, . . . ,CIℓ) by calling EncodeCID(ID|ℓ). It outputs a ciphertext header
CHID|ℓ,T =
(
C0 = gs1,
{
Ci = F1,i(CIi)s
}ℓ
i=1, CL+1 = H1(T )
s
)
∈Gℓ+21
and a session key EK = Λs.
HIBE.Decrypt(CHID|ℓ,T ,SKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP): Let CHID|ℓ,T =(C0,{Ci}ℓi=1,CL+1) and SKID′|ℓ,T ′ =(D0,{Di}ℓi=1,DL+1).
If (ID|ℓ= ID′|ℓ)∧(T = T ′), then it outputs the session key EK by computing e1,2(C0,D0) ·∏ℓi=1 e1,2(Ci,Di) ·
e1,2(CL+1,DL+1). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Let N = {1, . . . ,N} where N is the (polynomial) number of users. We describe the PKBE scheme of
Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [6].
PKBE.Setup(GDSBLM,N): Let GDSBLM = ((p,~G= (G1,G2),e1,1),g1,g2) and N be the maximum number
of users. It selects random exponents α ,γ ∈ Zp and outputs a master key MK = (α ,γ), an element
Y = gγ1, and public parameters
PP =
(
GDSBLM,
{
X j = gα
j
1
}
1≤ j, j 6=N+1≤2N , Γ = g
αN+1
2
)
.
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PKBE.GenKey(d,MK,PP): Let d ∈N be an index and MK = (α ,γ). It outputs a private key SKd =
(
K =
gα
dγ
1
)
.
PKBE.Encrypt(S,β ,Y,PP): Let S be a set of receiver indexes, β be a random exponent in Zp, and Y = gγ1
be a group element in G1. It outputs a ciphertext header
CHS =
(
E0 = g
β
1 , E1 =
(
Y ∏
j∈S
XN+1− j
)β)
and a session key EK = Γβ .
PKBE.Decrypt(CHS,SKd ,PP): Let CHS = (E0,E1) and SKd = K. If d ∈ S, then it outputs the session key
EK by computing e(Xd ,E1) · e(E0,K ·∏ j∈S, j 6=d XN+1− j+d)−1. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Theorem 3.1 ( [6]). The BGW-PKBE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the
N-BDHE assumption holds.
3.3 Construction
By using the HIBE and PKBE schemes that are described in the previous section, we can build an RHIBE
scheme. Our RHIBE scheme with history-preserving updates in multilinear maps is described as follows:
RHIBE.Setup(1λ ,N,L): Let N be the maximum number users in each depth and L be the maximum depth
of the hierarchical identity.
1. It first generates a multilinear group ~G = (G1,G2,G3) of prime order p. Let GDSMLM =
(p,~G,{e1,1,e1,2,e2,1},g1,g2,g3) be the description of the multilinear group where g1,g2,g3 are
generators of G1,G2,G3 respectively.
2. It obtains MKHIBE ,PPHIBE by running HIBE.Setup(GDSMLM ,L). It also obtains MKBE =
(α ,γ),PPBE by running PKBE.Setup(GDSMLM ,N).
3. It selects a random exponent βε ∈Zp and saves (βε ,γε ) to STε where βε = βID0 and γε = γID0 = γ .
It outputs a master key MK =α , an empty revocation list RLε , a state STε , and public parameters
PP =
(
GDSMLM , PPHIBE , PPBE, gα
N+1
2 , g
βε
2 , Ω = g
αN+1βε
3
)
.
RHIBE.GenKey(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) ∈ Iℓ and SKID|ℓ−1 =
(
{di,LSK′i}ℓ−1i=1
)
where LSK′i =(K′i,0,K′i,1,R′i,0,R′i,1) and ℓ≥ 1. It obtains CID|ℓ=(CI1, . . . ,CIℓ) by calling EncodeCID(ID|ℓ).
Recall that SKID|0 is empty.
1. If a tuple (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) exist in STID|ℓ−1 , then it retrieves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) from STID|ℓ−1 . Other-
wise, it selects random exponents βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1 ∈ Zp and saves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) to STID|ℓ−1 .
2. If ℓ≥ 2, then it selects a random exponent rℓ−1,2 ∈ Zp and creates an updated level private key
LSKℓ−1 =
(
Kℓ−1,0 = K′ℓ−1,0 ·g
−rℓ−1,2
1 , Kℓ−1,1 = K
′
ℓ−1,1,
Rℓ−1,0 = g
βID|ℓ−1
2 , Rℓ−1,1 =
(
gα
N+1
2
)βID|ℓ−1 · (gβID|ℓ−22 )rℓ−1,2
)
where gαN+12 can be retrieved from PP and g
βID|ℓ−2
2 can be retrieved from LSKℓ−2 or PP.
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3. It assigns a unique index dℓ ∈ N to the identity ID|ℓ and adds a tuple (ID|ℓ,dℓ) to STID|ℓ−1 . It
obtains SKBE,dℓ =KBE = g
αdℓ γID|ℓ−1
1 by running PKBE.GenKey(dℓ,γID|ℓ−1 ,PPBE). Next, it selects
a random exponent rℓ,1 ∈ Zp and creates a level private key
LSKℓ =
(
Kℓ,0 = KBE ·F1,ℓ(CIℓ)−rℓ,1, Kℓ,1 = g
−rℓ,1
1 , Rℓ,0 = 1G2 , Rℓ,1 = 1G2
)
∈G21×G
2
2.
4. Finally, it outputs a private key SKID|ℓ =
({
di,LSKi = LSK′i
}ℓ−2
i=1 ,
{
di,LSKi
}ℓ
i=ℓ−1
)
.
RHIBE.UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1,UKT,RID|ℓ−2 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let UKT,RID|ℓ−2 =
(
{SIID|i ,LUK′i}
ℓ−2
i=0
)
where LUKi =
(Ui,0,Ui,1,Ui,2) and ℓ≥ 1. Recall that UKT,ID|−1 is empty.
1. It defines a revoked set RID|ℓ−1 of user identities at time T from RLID|ℓ−1 . From RID|ℓ−1 , it defines
a revoked index set RIID|ℓ−1 ⊆N by using STID|ℓ−1 since STID|ℓ−1 contains (ID|ℓ,dℓ). After that,
it defines a non-revoked index set SIID|ℓ−1 =N \RIID|ℓ−1 .
2. It retrieves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) from STID|ℓ−1 . It obtains CHBE =(E0,E1) by running PKBE.Encrypt
(SIID|ℓ−1 ,βID|ℓ−1 ,YID|ℓ−1 = g
γID|ℓ−1
1 ,PPBE). It selects a random exponent rℓ−1 ∈ Zp and creates a
level update key
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 = E0, Uℓ−1,1 = E1 ·H1(T )rℓ−1 , Uℓ−1,2 = g−rℓ−11
)
∈G31.
3. Finally, it outputs an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 =
({
SIID|i , LUKi = LUK′i
}ℓ−2
i=0 ,
{
SIID|ℓ−1 , LUKℓ−1
})
.
RHIBE.DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let SKID|ℓ =({di,LSKi}ℓi=1)where LSKi =(Ki,0,Ki,1,Ri,0,Ri,1)
and ℓ≥ 1, and UKT,RID|ℓ−1 = ({SIID|i ,LUKi}
ℓ−1
i=0 ) where LUKi = (Ui,0,Ui,1,Ui,2). If ID|ℓ ∈ RID|ℓ−1 , then
it outputs ⊥ since the identity ID|ℓ is revoked. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows:
1. For each i∈ [ℓ], it retrieves {di,LSKi =(Ki,0,Ki,1,Ri,0,Ri,1)} and {SIID|i−1 ,LUKi−1 =(Ui−1,0,Ui−1,1,
Ui−1,2)} and computes the following components
Ai,0 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,1) · e1,1
(
Ui−1,0,Ki,0 ∏
j∈SIID|i−1 , j 6=di
XN+1− j+di
)−1
,
Ai,1 = e1,1(Ui−1,0,Ki,1), Ai,2 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,2).
2. Next, it derives a temporal decryption key
T DKID|ℓ,T =
(
D0 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,0 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
R−1i,1 ,
{
Di = Ai,1
}ℓ
i=1, DL+1 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,2
)
∈Gℓ+22 .
3. Finally, it outputs a decryption key DKID|ℓ,T by running HIBE.RandKey(T DKID|ℓ,T ,PPHIBE).
RHIBE.Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ). It first chooses a random exponent s ∈ Zp and
obtains CHHIBE by running HIBE.Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,s,PPHIBE). It outputs a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T =(
C = Ωs ·M, CHHIBE
)
.
RHIBE.Decrypt(CTID|ℓ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP): Let CTID|ℓ,T = (C,CHHIBE). If (ID|ℓ = ID′|ℓ)∧ (T = T ′), then
it obtains EKHIBE by running HIBE.Decrypt(CHHIBE ,DKID′,T ′ ,PPHIBE) and outputs the message M
by computing M =C ·EK−1HIBE . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
RHIBE.Revoke(ID|ℓ,T,RLID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1): If (ID|ℓ,−) /∈ STID|ℓ−1 , then it outputs ⊥ since the private key
of ID|ℓ was not generated. Otherwise, it updates RLID|ℓ−1 by adding (ID|ℓ,T ) to RLID|ℓ−1 .
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3.4 Correctness
Let SKID|ℓ = ({di,LSKi}ℓi=1) be a private key for ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) where LSKi = (Ki,0,Ki,1,Ri,0,Ri,1) and di
is an index for ID|i = (I1, . . . , Ii). Let UKT,RID|ℓ−1 = ({SIID|i ,LUKi}
ℓ−1
i=0 ) be an update key for time T and a
revoked set RID|ℓ−1 . If ID|ℓ 6∈ RID|ℓ−1 , then we obtain the following equations
Ai,0 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,1) · e1,1
(
Ui−1,0,Ki,0 · ∏
j∈SIID|i−1 , j 6=di
XN+1− j+di
)−1
= EKBE · e1,1(Xdi,H1(T )
ri) · e1,1(E0,F1,i(CIi)ri,1g
ri,2
1 )
= g
αN+1βID|i−1
2 H2(T )
αdi riF2,i(CIi)βID|i−1ri,1g
βID|i−1ri,2
2 ,
Ai,1 = e1,1(Ui−1,0,Ki,1) = e1,1
(
g
βID|i−1
1 ,g
−ri,1
1
)
= g
−βID|i−1ri,1
2 ,
Ai,2 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,2) = e1,1
(
gα
di
1 ,g
−ri
1
)
= g−α
diri
2
from the correctness of the PKBE scheme. The decryption key derivation algorithm correctly derives a
temporal decryption key as
D0 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,0 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
R−1i,1
=
ℓ
∏
i=1
g
αN+1βID|i−1
2 H2(T )
αdi riF2,i(CIi)βID|i−1 ri,1g
βID|i−1ri,2
2 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
g
−αN+1βID|i
2 g
−βID|i−1ri,2
2
= gα
N+1βε
2 ·
ℓ
∏
i=1
F2,i(CIi)βID|i−1ri,1 ·H2(T )∑
ℓ
i=1 α
diri ,
DL+1 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,2 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
g−α
di ri
2 = g
−∑ℓi=1 αdiri
2 .
Note that the temporal decryption key is the same as the private key of the above HIBE scheme.
3.5 Security Analysis
We first prove the security of the modified HIBE scheme. Note that the selective KEM security model of the
modified HIBE scheme can be easily derived from the original selective KEM security model of HIBE by
simply incorporating a time period T in private keys and the challenge ciphertext. We omit the description
of the security model.
Theorem 3.2. The above modified HIBE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the
(3,N)-MDHE assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above HIBE scheme with a non-negligible
advantage. A simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =(
g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1,g
c
1
)
and Z where Z = Z0 = ga
N+1bc
3 or Z = Z1 ∈ G3. Then B that
interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID∗|ℓ∗ = (I∗1 , . . . , I∗ℓ∗) and challenge time T ∗. It obtains
CID∗|ℓ∗ = (CI∗1 , . . . ,CI∗ℓ∗) by calling EncodeCID(ID∗|ℓ∗).
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Setup: B first chooses random exponents { f ′i,0}1≤i≤L,{ f ′i, j,k}1≤i≤L,1≤ j≤l1,k∈{0,1},h′0,{h′j,k}1≤ j≤l2,k∈{0,1},∈
Zp. It implicitly sets α = aN+1b and publishes the public parameters PP as
~f1,i =
(
f1,i,0 = g f
′
i,0
1
( l1∏
j=1
f1,i, j,CI∗ [ j]
)−1
,
{ f1,i, j,k =
(
ga
N
1
) f ′i, j,k}
1≤i≤L,1≤ j≤l1,k∈{0,1}
)
,
~h1 =
(
h1,0 = g
h′0
1
( l2∏
j=1
h1, j,T ∗[ j]
)−1
,
{
h1, j,k =
(
gb1
)h′j,k}
1≤ j≤l2,k∈{0,1}
)
,
Λ = e
(
e(gα1 ,g
αN
1 ),g
b
1
)
= gα
N+1b
3 .
For notational simplicity, we define ∆CIi = ∑l1j=1( f ′i, j,CI[ j]− f ′i, j,CI∗ [ j]) and ∆T = ∑l2j=1(h′j,T [ j]−h′j,T ∗[ j]). We
have ∆CIi 6≡ 0 mod p except with negligible probability if CIi 6= CI∗i since there exists at least one index
j such that f ′i, j,CI[ j] 6= f ′i, j,CI∗ [ j] and { f ′i, j,k} are randomly chosen. We also have ∆T 6≡ 0 mod p except with
negligible probability if T 6= T ∗.
Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key queries. If this is a private key query
for a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) and a time period T , then B obtains CID|ℓ = (CI1, . . . ,CIℓ) by
calling EncodeCID(ID|ℓ) and proceeds as follows.
• Case IDℓ 6∈ Prefix(ID∗|ℓ∗): In this case, we have CIℓ 6= CI∗i for all i by the property of the encoding
function [18]. It selects random exponents r1, . . . ,rℓ−1,r′ℓ,rL+1 ∈ Zp and creates a private key SKIDℓ,T
by implicitly setting rℓ = (−a/∆CIℓ+ r′ℓ)b as
D0 = e
(
(ga1)
− f ′ℓ,0/∆CIℓF1(CIℓ)r
′
ℓ ,gb1
)
·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(CIi)ri ·H2(T )rL+1 ,
{
Di = gri2
}
1≤i≤ℓ−1, Dℓ = e
(
(ga1)
−1/∆CIℓgr
′
ℓ
1 ,g
b
1
)
, DL+1 = g
rL+1
2 .
• Case ID|ℓ = ID∗|ℓ∗ : In this case, we have T 6= T ∗. It selects random exponents r1, . . . ,rℓ,r′L+1 ∈ Zp
and creates a private key SKIDℓ,T by implicitly setting rL+1 = (−a/∆T + r′L+1)aN as
D0 = e
(
(ga1)
−h′0/∆T H1(T )r
′
L+1 ,ga
N
1
)
·
ℓ
∏
i=1
F2,i(CIi)ri ,
{Di = gri2 }1≤i≤ℓ, DL+1 = e
(
(ga1)
−1/∆T gr
′
L+1
1 ,g
aN
1
)
.
Challenge: B creates the challenge ciphertext header CH∗ by implicitly setting s = c as
C0 = gc1,
{
Ci = (gc1) f
′
i,0
}
1≤i≤ℓ∗ , CL+1 = (g
c
1)
h′0
and the challenge session key EK∗ = Z.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. B also outputs µ ′.
Theorem 3.3. The above RHIBE scheme is SRL-IND secure if the (3,N)-MDHE assumption holds where
N is the maximum number of child users in the system.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RHIBE scheme with a non-negligible
advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G1,G2,G3),g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1,g
c
1
)
and Z where Z = Z0 = ga
N+1bc
3 or Z = Z1 ∈
G3. Note that a challenge tuple DBDHE =
(
(p,G1,G2),g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1
)
for the BDHE
assumption can be derived from the challenge tuple D of the MDHE assumption. Let BHIBEbe the simulator
in the security proof of Theorem 3.2 and BPKBE be a simulator in security proof of Theorem 3.1. Then B
that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID∗|ℓ∗ = (I∗1 , . . . , I∗ℓ∗), a challenge time period T ∗, and a revoked
identity set R∗ = (R∗ID0 , . . . ,R
∗
IDL−1) at the time period T
∗
. It first sets a state ST and a revocation list RL as
empty one. For each IDk ∈ {ID∗}∪R∗, it selects a unique index di ∈N such that (−,di) /∈ STIDk−1 and adds
(IDk,di) to STIDk−1 . Let RI∗ = (RI∗ID0 , . . . ,RI
∗
IDℓ∗−1) ⊆ N be the revoked index set of R
∗ at the time T ∗ and
SI∗ = (SI∗ID1 , . . . ,SI
∗
IDℓ∗−1) be the non-revoked index set at the time T ∗ such that SI∗IDx =N \RI∗IDx .
Setup: B submits ID∗ℓ∗ and T ∗ to BHIBE and receives PPHIBE . It also submits SI∗ε to BPKBE and re-
ceives PPPKBE . Note that {ID∗i /∈ RID∗i−1}1≤i<x and {ID
∗
i ∈ RID∗i−1}x≤i≤ℓ∗ . B first chooses random expo-
nents θID∗0 , . . . ,θID∗ℓ∗−1 ,
ˆβID∗0 , . . . , ˆβID∗x−1 ,βID∗x , . . . ,βID∗ℓ∗ ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets α = a,βε = b+ ˆβID0 ,{βIDi =
b+ ˆβIDi}1≤i<x,{γID∗x = θID∗x −∑ j∈SIID∗x aN+1− j}0≤x≤ℓ∗−1 and publishes the public parameters PP as
PP =
(
PPHIBE , PPPKBE, gα
N+1
2 = e(g
a
1,g
aN
2 ), g
βε
2 = g
b+ ˆβID0
2 = e(g1,g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID0
1 ),
Ω = gα
N+1βε
3 = g
aN+1(b+ ˆβID0)
3 = e
(
e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
b
1
)
· e
(
e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
ˆβID0
1
))
.
Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries.
If this is a private key query for an identity ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ), then B proceeds as follows: Note that SKID|ℓ =(
{di,LSKi}ℓi=1
)
where LSKi = (Ki,0,Ki,1,Ri,0,Ri,1).
• Case ID|ℓ−1 /∈ Prefix(ID∗|ℓ∗): It first normally generates a state STID|ℓ−1 and adds a tuple (ID|ℓ,dℓ) to
STID|ℓ−1 where dℓ is an index for ID|ℓ. It obtains SKID|ℓ−1 by requesting an RHIBE private key query for
ID|ℓ−1 toBHIBE . Next, it simply generates SKID|ℓ by running RHIBE.GenKey(ID|ℓ,SKID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP).
• Case ID|ℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗|ℓ∗): Note that ID0 = IDℓ−1 is included in this case. We have IDℓ =
(I∗1 , . . . , I∗ℓ−1, Iℓ), {ID
∗
i /∈ RID∗i−1}1≤i<x and {ID
∗
i ∈ RID∗i−1}x≤i≤ℓ−1.
– Case ID|ℓ ∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 : In this case, it first retrieves a tuple (IDℓ,dℓ) from STID∗ℓ−1 where the index
dℓ is associated with IDℓ. Note that the tuple (IDℓ,dℓ) exists since all identities in R∗ID∗ℓ−1 were
added to STID∗ℓ−1 in the initialization step.
If 1 ≤ i < x, the simulator can use the cancellation technique by using the random blind el-
ement. It recalls random exponents θID∗0 , . . . ,θID∗x−2 , ˆβID∗0 , . . . , ˆβID∗x−1 and selects random ex-
ponents r1,1, . . . ,rx−1,1, rˆ1,2, . . . , rˆx−1,2 ∈ Zp and creates level private keys by implicitly setting
{ri,2 = rˆi,2 −a
N+1}1≤i<x as
{
LSKi =
(
Ki,0 =
(
ga
di
1
)θID∗i−1( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1 , j 6=di
ga
N+1− j+di
1
)−1F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g−rˆi,21 , Ki,1 = g−ri,11 ,
Ri,0 = e(gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g1), Ri,1 = (g
aN+1
2 )
ˆβID∗i · e(gb1,g
rˆi,2
1 ) ·g
rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1
2 · (g
aN+1
2 )
− ˆβID∗i−1
)}
1≤i<x
.
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If i = x, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6]. It recalls random
exponents γID∗i−1 , ˆβID∗i−1 ,βID∗i and obtains SKBE = KBE by requesting an PKBE private key query
for (di,γID∗i−1). Next, it selects random exponents ri,1,ri,2 ∈ Zp and creates a level private key as
LSKi =
(
Ki,0 = KBE ·F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g
−ri,2
1 , Ki,1 = g
−ri,1
1 ,
Ri,0 = e(g
βID∗i
1 ,g1), Ri,1 = e(g
aN
1 ,g
a
1)
βIDi · e(gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g
ri,2
1 )
)
.
If x < i ≤ ℓ− 1, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6]. It recalls
random exponents γID∗x , . . . ,γID∗ℓ−2 ,βID∗x , . . . ,βID∗ℓ−1 and obtains {SKBE,i = KBE,i}x<i≤ℓ−1 by re-
questing an PKBE private key query for {(di,γID∗i−1)}x<i≤ℓ−1. Next, it selects random exponents
rx+1,1, . . . ,rℓ−1,1,rx+1,2, . . . ,rℓ−1,2 ∈ Zp and creates level private keys as
{LSKi =
(
Ki,0 = KBE ·F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g
−ri,2
1 , Ki,1 = g
−ri,1
1 ,
Ri,0 = e(g
βIDi
1 ,g1), Ri,1 = e(g
aN
1 ,g
a
1)
βIDi · e(g
βID∗i−1
1 ,g
ri,2
1 )
)
}x<i≤ℓ−1.
If i = ℓ, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6]. It recalls a random
exponent γID∗i−1 and obtains SKBE =KBE by requesting an PKBE private key query for (di,γID∗i−1).
Next, it selects a random exponent ri,1 ∈ Zp and creates a level private key as
LSKi =
(
Ki,0 = KBE ·F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g
−ri,2
1 , Ki,1 = g
−ri,1
1 ,
Ri,0 = 1G2 , Ri,1 = 1G2
)
.
– Case IDℓ /∈R∗ID∗ℓ−1 : In this case, we have {IDi /∈RIDi−1}1≤i≤ℓ and ℓ< x, since, if a parents identity
is revoked IDi ∈ RIDi−1 , then a child identity should be revoked IDi+1 ∈ RIDi . It first selects an
index dℓ ∈ N such that (−,dℓ) /∈ STID∗ℓ−1 and adds (IDℓ,dℓ) to STID∗ℓ−1 .
If 1 ≤ i < ℓ− 1, the simulator can use the cancellation technique by using the random blind
element. It recalls random exponents θID∗0 , . . . ,θID∗ℓ−2 , ˆβID∗0 , . . . , ˆβID∗ℓ−1 and selects random ex-
ponents r1,1, . . . ,rℓ−1,1, rˆ1,2, . . . , rˆℓ−1,2 ∈ Zp and creates level private keys by implicitly setting
{ri,2 = rˆi,2 −a
N+1,γID∗i−1 = θID∗i−1 −∑ j∈SIID∗i−1 a
N+1− j}1≤i<ℓ as
{
LSKi =
(
Ki,0 =
(
ga
di
1
)θID∗i−1( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1 , j 6=di
ga
N+1− j+di
1
)−1F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g−rˆi,21 , Ki,1 = g−ri,11 ,
Ri,0 = e(gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g1), Ri,1 = (g
aN+1
2 )
ˆβID∗i · e(gb1,g
rˆi,2
1 ) ·g
rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1
2 · (g
aN+1
2 )
− ˆβID∗i−1
)}
1≤i<ℓ
.
If i = ℓ, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh and Boyen [3]. We have
Ii 6= I∗i from the restriction of Definition 3.2. It selects a random exponent r′i,1 ∈ Zp and creates
a level private key by implicitly setting ri,1 =−a/∆Ii + r′i,1 as
LSKi =
(
Ki,0 = g
adθIDi−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 (g
a
1)
f ′0/∆IiF1,i(Ii)−r
′
i,1, Ki,1 = (ga1)
−1/∆Iig
r′i,1
1 ,
Ri,0 = 1G2 , Ri,1 = 1G2
)
.
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If this is an update key query for an identity ID|ℓ−1 = (I1, . . . , Iℓ−1) and a time period T , then B defines
a revoked identity set RIDℓ−1 at the time T from RLIDℓ−1 and proceeds as follows: Note that UKT,RIDℓ−1 =(
{SIIDi ,LUKi}ℓ−1i=0
)
where LUKi = (Ui,0,Ui,1,Ui,2). We assume that (I1 = I∗1 ), . . . ,(Iy = I∗y ),(Iy+1 6= I∗y+1), . . . ,
(Iℓ−1 6= I∗ℓ−1) where 1 ≤ y≤ ℓ−1. And, we have {ID∗i /∈ RID∗i−1}1≤i<x and {ID
∗
i ∈ RID∗i−1}x≤i≤ℓ−1.
• Case T 6= T ∗ : It first sets a revoked index set RIIDℓ−1 of RIDℓ−1 by using STIDℓ−1 . It also sets SIIDℓ−1 =
Nℓ \RIIDℓ−1 .
If 0 ≤ i ≤ x, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh and Boyen [3]. It recalls a
random exponent ˆβID∗0 , . . . , ˆβID∗x ,θID∗0 , . . . ,θID∗x and selects a random exponent r′0, . . . ,r′x ∈ Zp. It creates
level update keys by implicitly setting {ri = −(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi a
N+1− j +∑ j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i a
N+1− j)/∆T +
r′i}0≤i≤x as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 ,
Ui,1 = (gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 )
θID∗i
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T H1(T )r′i ,
Ui,2 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
gr
′
i
1
)}
0≤i≤x
.
If x < i ≤ y, it recalls a random exponent βID∗x+1 , . . . ,βID∗y ,θID∗x+1 , . . . ,θID∗y and selects a random expo-
nent rx+1, . . . ,ry ∈ Zp. It creates a level update key as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = g
βID∗i
1 ,
Ui,1 =
(
gθIDi1
( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i H1(T )ri
Ui,2 = gri1
)}
x<i≤y
.
If y < i ≤ ℓ− 1, the simulator can normally generate level private keys. It selects random exponents
ry+1, . . . ,rℓ−1,γIDy+1 , . . . ,γIDℓ−1 ,βIDy+1 , . . . ,βIDℓ−1 ∈ Zp and creates level private keys as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = g
βIDi
1 , Ui,1 =
(
gγIDi1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)βIDi H1(T )ri , Ui,2 = g−ri1
)}
y<i≤ℓ−1
.
• Case T = T ∗ : We have R=R∗. For each IDi ∈R∗ID∗i−1 , it adds (IDi,T
∗) to RLID∗i−1 if (IDi,T
′) /∈RLID∗i−1
for any T ′ ≤ T ∗.
If 0 ≤ i ≤ x, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6]. It recalls random
exponents ˆβID∗0 , . . . , ˆβID∗x ,θID∗0 , . . . ,θID∗x and selects a random exponent r0, . . . ,rx ∈ Zp. It creates level
update keys as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 , Ui,1 = (g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 )
θID∗i H1(T ∗)ri,0 , Ui,2 = g
−ri,0
1
)}
0≤i≤x
.
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If x < i ≤ y, the simulator can use the partitioning technique of Boneh et al. [6]. It recalls random
exponents βID∗x+1 , . . . ,βID∗y ,θID∗x+1 , . . . ,θID∗y and selects a random exponent rx+1, . . . ,ry ∈ Zp. It creates
level update keys as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = g
βID∗i
1 , Ui,1 = (g
βID∗i
1 )
θID∗i H1(T ∗)ri,0 , Ui,2 = g
−ri,0
1
)}
x<i≤y
.
If y < i ≤ ℓ− 1, the simulator can normally generate level private keys. It selects random exponents
ry+1, . . . ,rℓ−1,γIDy+1 , . . . ,γIDℓ−1 ,βIDy+1 , . . . ,βIDℓ−1 ∈ Zp and creates level private keys as
{
LUKi =
(
Ui,0 = g
βIDi
1 , Ui,1 =
(
gγIDi1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)βIDi H1(T )ri , Ui,2 = g−ri1
)}
y<i≤ℓ−1
.
If this is a decryption key query for an identity ID = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) and a time period T , then B proceeds as
follows: It requests an HIBE private key for ID and T to BHIBE and receives SKHIBE,ID,T . Next, it sets the
decryption key DKID,T = SKHIBE,ID,T .
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B chooses a random bit δ ∈ {0,1} and proceed as
follows: It requests the challenge ciphertext for ID∗ and T ∗ to BHIBE and receives CHHIBE,ID∗,T ∗ . Next, it
sets the challenge ciphertext CTID∗,T ∗ =
(
C = Z · e(e(ga1,ga
N
1 ),g
c
1)
ˆβID0 ·M∗δ , CHHIBE,ID∗,T ∗
)
.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess δ ′ ∈ {0,1}. B outputs 0 if δ = δ ′ or 1 otherwise.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct from Lemma 3.4. This
completes our proof.
Lemma 3.4. The distribution of the above simulation is correct if Z = Z0, and the challenge ciphertext is
independent of δ in the adversary’s view if Z = Z1.
Proof. We show that the distribution of private keys is correct. In case of IDℓ ∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 and IDℓ−1 ∈
Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗), we have that the private key is correctly distributed from the setting {ri,2 = rˆi,2−aN+1}1≤i<x,
{βID∗i = b+ ˆβID∗i }0≤i<x, and {γID∗i−1 = θID∗i−1 −∑ j∈SIID∗i−1 a
N+1− j}1≤i<x as the following equation
{Ki,0 = g
αdi γID∗i−1
1 F1,i(Ii)
−ri,1 ·g−ri,21 = g
adi θID∗i−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1
g−a
N+1− j+di F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g
−rˆi,2+aN+1
1
= g
adi θID∗i−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 ·g
−aN+1
1 F1,i(Ii)
−ri,1 ·g−rˆi,21 ·g
aN+1
1
=
(
ga
di
1
)θID∗i−1( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
ga
N+1− j+di
1
)−1F1,i(Ii)−ri,1g−rˆi,21 ,
Ri,0 = g
βID∗i−1
2 = g
b+ ˆβID∗i−1
2 = e(g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g1),
Ri,1 = g
αN+1βIDi
2 ·g
βIDi−1 ri,2
2 = g
aN+1(b+ ˆβID∗i )
2 ·g
(b+ ˆβID∗i−1)(rˆi,2−a
N+1)
2
= g
aN+1b+aN+1 ˆβID∗i
2 ·g
rˆi,2b−aN+1b+rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1−a
N+1 ˆβID∗i−1
2
= (ga
N+1
2 )
ˆβID∗i · e(gb1,g
rˆi,2
1 ) ·g
rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1
2 · (g
aN+1
2 )
− ˆβID∗i−1}1≤i<x.
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{Ri,1 = g
αN+1βIDi
2 ·g
βIDi−1 ri,2
2 = e(g
αN
1 ,g
α
1 )
βIDi · e(gβIDi−11 ,g
ri,2
1 ) = e(g
aN
1 ,g
a
1)
βIDi · e(gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g
ri,2
1 )}i=x.
In case of IDℓ /∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 and IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID
∗
ℓ∗), we have that the private key is correctly distributed from
the setting {ri,2 = rˆi,2 − aN+1}1≤i<ℓ, {βID∗i = b+ ˆβID∗i }0≤i<ℓ, rℓ,1 = −a/∆Iℓ + r′ℓ,1, and {γID∗i−1 = θID∗i−1 −
∑ j∈SIID∗i−1 a
N+1− j}0≤i<ℓ as the following equation
{Ki,0 = g
αdi γID∗i−1
1 F1,i(Ii)
−ri,1 ·g−ri,21 = g
adi θID∗i−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1
g−a
N+1− j+di F1,i(Ii)−ri,1 ·g
−rˆi,2+aN+1
1
= g
adi θID∗i−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 ·g
−aN+1
1 F1,i(Ii)
−ri,1 ·g−rˆi,21 ·g
aN+1
1
=
(
ga
di
1
)θID∗i−1( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
ga
N+1− j+di
1
)−1F1,i(Ii)−ri,1g−rˆi,21 ,
Ri,0 = g
βID∗i−1
2 = g
b+ ˆβID∗i−1
2 = e(g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗i−1
1 ,g1),
Ri,1 = g
αN+1βIDi
2 ·g
βIDi−1 ri,2
2 = g
aN+1(b+ ˆβID∗i )
2 ·g
(b+ ˆβID∗i−1)(rˆi,2−a
N+1)
2
= g
aN+1b+aN+1 ˆβID∗i
2 ·g
rˆi,2b−aN+1b+rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1−a
N+1 ˆβID∗i−1
2
= (ga
N+1
2 )
ˆβID∗i · e(gb1,g
rˆi,2
1 ) ·g
rˆi,2 ˆβID∗i−1
2 · (g
aN+1
2 )
− ˆβID∗i−1}1≤i<ℓ.
{Ki,0 = g
α
dIDi−1 γIDx−1
1 F1,i(Ii)
−ri,1 = g
adi θIDi−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1
g−a
N+1− j+di( f1,0
l
∏
j=1
f1,i,Ii [ j]
)−ri,1
= g
adi θIDi−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 ·g
−aN+1
1
(
g f
′
0
1 g
aN ∆Ii
1
)a/∆I1−r′i−1,1
= g
adi θIDi−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi−1\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 (g
a
1)
f ′0/∆IiF1,i(Ii)−r
′
i,1,
Ki,1 = g
ri,1
1 = (g
a
1)
−1/∆Ii g
r′i,1
1 }i=ℓ.
Next, we show that the distribution of update keys is correct. In case of T 6= T ∗, we have that the update
key is correctly distributed from the setting {ri = −(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi a
N+1− j +∑ j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i a
N+1− j)/∆T +
r′i}0≤i≤x, {βID∗i = b+ ˆβID∗i }0≤i≤x, and {γID∗i = θID∗i −∑ j∈SIID∗i a
N+1− j}1≤i≤y as the following equation
{Ui,0 =g
βID∗i
1 = g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 ,
Ui,1 =
(
gγIDi1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
gα
N+1− j
1
)βIDi−1 H1(T )ri+1,0
=
(
gθIDi1
( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)b+ ˆβID∗i (h1,0
t
∏
k=1
h1,k,T [k]
)ri+1,0
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=(g
b+ ˆβID∗i
1 )
θIDi
(
∏
j∈SI∗IDi\SIIDi
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi\SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)b+ ˆβID∗i
·
(
gh
′
0
1 g
b∆T
1
)−(−∑ j∈SI∗IDi\SIIDi aN+1− j+∑ j∈SIIDi \SI∗IDi aN+1− j)/∆T+r′i+1,0
=(gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗i
1 )
θID∗i
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T H1(T )r′i,0 ,
Ui,2 =g
ri,0
1 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗i \SIIDi
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi\SI∗ID∗i
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
g
r′i,0
1 }0≤i≤x.
{Ui,1 =
(
g
γID∗i
1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i H1(T )ri =
(
gθIDi1
( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1 ∏
j∈SIIDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i H1(T )ri}x<i≤y.
In case of T = T ∗, we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting {βID∗i = b+ ˆβID∗i }0≤i<x
and {γIDi = θIDi −∑ j∈SI∗IDi a
N+1− j}0≤i≤y as the following equation
{Ui,1 =
(
gγIDi1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i ·H1(T ∗)ri =
(
gθIDi1
( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1
· ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)b+ ˆβIDi
·H1(T ∗)ri
= (gb1 ·g
β IDi
1 )
θIDi H1(T ∗)ri,0 }1≤i≤x−1,
{Ui,1 =
(
gγIDi1 ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i ·H1(T ∗)ri =
(
gθIDi1
( ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1
· ∏
j∈SI∗IDi
ga
N+1− j
1
)βID∗i ·H1(T ∗)ri
= (g
βID∗i
1 )
θIDi H1(T ∗)ri}x<i≤y.
Finally, we show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is correct. If Z = Z0 = ga
N+1bc
3 is given,
then the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as the following equation
C = Ωs ·M∗δ =
(
e(e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
b
1) · e(e(g
a
1,g
aN
1 ),g
ˆβID0
1 )
)c
·M∗δ
= e(e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
b
1)
c · e(e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
ˆβID0
1 )
c ·M∗δ
= Z0 · e(e(ga1,g
aN
1 ),g
c
1)
ˆβID0 ·M∗δ
Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A’s view since Z1 is a
random element in G3. This completes our proof.
4 Revocable HIBE with History-Free Updates
In this section, we first define the syntax and the security model of RHIBE with history-free updates. Next,
we propose another RHIBE scheme with short private key and prove its security.
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4.1 Definition
Definition 4.1 (Revocable HIBE: History-Free Update). A revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme that is asso-
ciated with the identity space I , the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms
Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ,N,L): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ , the maximum number N of
users in each depth, and the maximum depth L of the identity. It outputs a master key MK, a revocation
list RLε , a state STε , and public parameters PP.
GenKey(ID|ℓ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The private key generation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity
ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) ∈ Iℓ, a state STID|ℓ−1 , and public parameters PP. It outputs a private key SKID|ℓ and
updates the state STID|ℓ−1 .
UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1 ,DKID|ℓ−1,T ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The update key generation algorithm takes as input up-
date time T ∈ T , a revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 , a decryption key DKID|ℓ−1,T , a state STID|ℓ−1 , and the public
parameters PP. It outputs an update key UKT,R|IDℓ−1 for T and RID|ℓ−1 where RID|ℓ−1 is the set of
revoked identities at the time T .
DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP): The decryption key derivation algorithm takes as input a private key
SKID|ℓ , an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a decryption key DKID|ℓ,T
or ⊥.
Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP): The encryption algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ=(I1, . . . , Iℓ)∈
I , time T , a message M ∈M, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T for ID|ℓ
and T .
Decrypt(CTID|ℓ ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP): The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T , a decryp-
tion key DKID′|ℓ,T ′ , and the public parameters PP. It outputs an encrypted message M or ⊥.
Revoke(ID|ℓ,T,RLID|ℓ−1,STID|ℓ−1 ): The revocation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID|ℓ and
revocation time T , a revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 , and a state STID|ℓ−1 . It updates the revocation list RLID|ℓ−1 .
The correctness property of RHIBE is defined as follows: For all MK, PP generated by Setup(1λ ,N,L),
SKIDℓ generated by GenKey(ID|ℓ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP) for any ID|ℓ, UKT,RID|ℓ−1 generated by UpdateKey (T,RLID|ℓ−1,
DKID|ℓ−1,T ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP) for any T and RLID|ℓ−1 , CTID|ℓ,T generated by Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP) for any ID|ℓ,
T , and M, it is required that
• If (ID|ℓ /∈ RID|ℓ−1), then DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP) = DKID|ℓ,T .
• If (ID|ℓ ∈ RID|ℓ−1), then DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
• If (ID|ℓ = ID′|ℓ)∧ (T = T ′), then Decrypt(CTID|ℓ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP) = M.
• If (ID|ℓ 6= ID′|ℓ)∨ (T 6= T ′), then Decrypt(CTID|ℓ,T ,DKID′|ℓ,T ′ ,PP) =⊥ with all but negligible proba-
bility.
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4.2 Construction
Our RHIBE scheme from three-leveled multilinear maps is described as follows:
RHIBE.Setup(1λ ,N,L): Let N be the maximum number users in each depth and L be the maximum depth
of the hierarchical identity.
1. It first generates a multilinear group ~G = (G1,G2,G3) of prime order p. Let GDSMLM =
(p,~G,{e1,1,e1,2,e2,1},g1,g2,g3) be the description of the multilinear group where g1,g2,g3 are
generators of G1,G2,G3 respectively.
2. It obtains MKHIBE ,PPHIBE by running HIBE.Setup(GDSMLM ,N,L). It also obtains MKBE =
(α ,γ),PPBE by running PKBE.Setup(GDSMLM ,N).
3. It selects a random exponent βε ∈ Zp and saves (βε ,γε ) to STε where βε = βID|0 and γε =
γID0 = γ . It outputs a master key MK = α , an empty revocation list RLε , a state STε , and public
parameters
PP =
(
GDSMLM , PPHIBE , PPBE, gα
N+1
2 , g
βε
2 , Ω = g
αN+1βε
3
)
.
RHIBE.GenKey(ID|ℓ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) ∈ Iℓ. It proceeds as follows:
1. If a tuple (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) exist in STID|ℓ−1 , then it retrieves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) from STID|ℓ−1 . Other-
wise, it selects random exponents βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1 ∈ Zp and saves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) to STID|ℓ−1 .
2. It assigns a unique index dℓ ∈ N to the identity ID|ℓ and adds a tuple (ID|ℓ,dℓ) to STID|ℓ−1 .
It obtains a private key SKBE,dℓ = KBE by running PKBE.GenKey(dℓ,γID|ℓ−1 ,PPBE). Next, it
selects a random exponent rℓ,1 ∈ Zp and creates a level private key
LSKℓ =
(
Kℓ,0 = KBE ·F1,ℓ(Iℓ)−rℓ,1, Kℓ,1 = g
−rℓ,1
1
)
∈G21.
3. Finally, it outputs a private key SKID|ℓ =
(
{dℓ,LSKℓ}
)
.
RHIBE.UpdateKey(T,RLID|ℓ−1,DKID|ℓ−1,T ,STID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let DKID|ℓ−1,T = (D0,{Di}ℓ−1i=1 ,DL+1) where ℓ≥
1. It proceeds as follows:
1. It defines a revoked set RID|ℓ−1 of user identities at time T from RLID|ℓ−1 . From RID|ℓ−1 , it defines
a revoked index set RIID|ℓ−1 ⊆N by using STID|ℓ−1 since STID|ℓ−1 contains (ID|ℓ,dℓ). After that,
it defines a non-revoked index set SIID|ℓ−1 =N \RIID|ℓ−1 .
2. It retrieves (βID|ℓ−1 ,γID|ℓ−1) from STID|ℓ−1 . It obtains CHBE =(E0,E1) by running PKBE.Encrypt
(SIID|ℓ−1 ,βID|ℓ−1 ,YID|ℓ−1 = g
γID|ℓ−1
1 ,PPBE). Next, it selects a random exponent rℓ−1 ∈ Zp and cre-
ates a level update key
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 = E0, Uℓ−1,1 = E1 ·H1(T )rℓ−1 , Uℓ−1,2 = g−rℓ−11
)
∈G31.
3. If ℓ= 1, then DKID|ℓ−1,T = MK and creates a partial decryption key PDK0 =
(
P0 = 1G2 , PL+1 =
1G2
)
. Otherwise (ℓ≥ 2), then it creates a partial decryption key
PDKℓ−1 =
(
P0 = D0 ·
(
gα
N+1
2
)−βID|ℓ−1 , {Pi = Di
}ℓ−1
i=1 , PL+1 = DL+1
)
∈Gℓ+22 .
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4. Finally, it outputs an update key UKT,RID|ℓ−1 =
(
PDKℓ−1,{SIID|ℓ−1 ,LUKℓ−1}
)
.
RHIBE.DeriveKey(SKID|ℓ ,UKT,RID|ℓ−1 ,PP): Let SKID|ℓ = ({dℓ,LSKℓ}) where LSKℓ = (K0,K1) and ℓ ≥ 1,
and UKT,RID|ℓ−1 = (PDKℓ−1,{SIID|ℓ−1 ,LUKℓ−1}) where PDKℓ−1 = (P0,{Pi}
ℓ−1
i=1 ,PL+1) and LUKℓ−1 =
(U0,U1,U2). If ID|ℓ ∈ RID|ℓ−1 , then it outputs ⊥ since the identity IDℓ is revoked. Otherwise, it
proceeds the following steps:
1. For i = ℓ, it retrieves {di,LSKi = (Ki,0,Ki,1)} and {SIID|i−1 ,LUKi−1 = (Ui−1,0,Ui−1,1,Ui−1,2)}
and computes the following components
Ai,0 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui,1) · e1,1
(
Ui−1,0,Ki,0 ∏
j∈SIID|i−1 , j 6=di
XN+1− j+di
)−1
,
Ai,1 = e1,1(Ui−1,0,Ki,1), Ai,2 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,2).
2. Next, it derives a temporal decryption key
T DKID|ℓ,T =
(
D0 = P0 ·Aℓ,0, {Di = Pi}ℓ−1i=1 , Dℓ = Aℓ,1, DL+1 = PL+1 ·Aℓ,2
)
∈Gℓ+22 .
3. Finally, it outputs a decryption key DKID|ℓ,T by running HIBE.RandKey(T DKID|ℓ,T ,PPHIBE).
RHIBE.Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,M,PP): Let ID|ℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ). It first chooses a random exponent s ∈ Zp and
obtains CHHIBE by running HIBE.Encrypt(ID|ℓ,T,s,PPHIBE). It outputs a ciphertext CTID|ℓ,T =(
C = Ωs ·M, CHHIBE
)
.
RHIBE.Decrypt(CTID,T ,DKID′,T ′ ,PP): Let CTID,T = (C,CHHIBE). If (ID = ID′)∧ (T = T ′), then it ob-
tains EKHIBE by running HIBE.Decrypt(CHHIBE ,DKID′,T ′ ,PPHIBE) and outputs the message M by
computing M =C ·EK−1HIBE . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
RHIBE.Revoke(ID|ℓ,T,RLID|ℓ−1 ,STID|ℓ−1): If (ID|ℓ,−) /∈ STID|ℓ−1 , then it outputs ⊥ since the private key
of ID|ℓ was not generated. Otherwise, it updates RLID|ℓ−1 by adding (ID|ℓ,T ) to RLID|ℓ−1 .
4.3 Correctness
Let SKIDℓ be a private key for an identity IDℓ that is associated with an index dIDℓ−1 , and UKT,RIDℓ−1 be an
update key for a time T and a revoked identity set RIDℓ−1 . We have
Ai,0 = EKBE · e1,1(Xdi ,H1(T )
ri) · e1,1(E0,F1,i(Ii)ri,1),
= g
αN+1βIDi−1
2 ·H2(T )
αdiri ·F2,i(Ii)βIDi−1 ri,1 ,
Ai,1 = e1,1(Ui−1,0,Ki,1) = e1,1
(
g
βIDi−1
1 ,g
−ri,1
1
)
= g
−βIDi−1ri,1
2 ,
Ai,2 = e1,1(Xdi ,Ui−1,2) = e1,1
(
gα
di
1 ,g
−ri
1
)
= g−α
di ri
2 .
If IDℓ /∈ RIDℓ−1 , then the decryption key derivation algorithm first correctly derives temporal decryption
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key as
D0 = P0 ·Aℓ,0 =
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
g−α
N+1βIDi
2 ·
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,0
=
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
g−α
N+1βIDi
2 ·
ℓ
∏
i=1
g
αN+1βIDi−1
2 H2(T )
αdi riF2,i(Ii)βIDi−1ri,1
= gα
N+1βε
2 ·
ℓ
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)βIDi−1 ri,1 ·H1(T )∑
ℓ
i=1 α
diri ,
Di = g
−βIDi−1ri,1
2 ∀i ∈ [ℓ], DL+1 = PL+1 ·Aℓ,2 =
ℓ
∏
i=1
Ai,2 = g
−∑ℓi=1 αdiri
2 .
4.4 Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RHIBE scheme via history-free approach, we carefully combine the partitioning
methods of the BGW-PKBE scheme [6], the BB-HIBE scheme [3], and our cancelation technique.
Theorem 4.1. The above RHIBE scheme is SRL-IND secure if the (3,N)-MDHE assumption holds where
N is the maximum child number of users in the system.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RHIBE scheme with a non-negligible
advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D =
(
(p,G1,G2,G3),g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1,g
c
1
)
and Z where Z = Z0 = ga
N+1bc
3 or Z = Z1 ∈
G3. Note that a challenge tuple DBDHE =
(
(p,G1,G2),g1,ga1,g
a2
1 , . . . ,g
aN
1 ,g
aN+2
1 , . . . ,g
a2N
1 ,g
b
1
)
for the BDHE
assumption can be derived from the challenge tuple D of the MDHE assumption. Let BHIBEbe the simulator
in the security proof of Theorem 3.2 and BPKBE be a simulator in security proof of Theorem 3.1. Then B
that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID∗ℓ∗ = (I∗1 , . . . , I∗ℓ∗), a challenge time T ∗, and a revoked identity
set R∗ = (R∗ID∗0 , . . . ,R
∗
ID∗
ℓ∗−1
) at the time T ∗. It first sets a state ST and a revocation list RL as empty one.
For each ID ∈ {ID∗}∪R∗, it selects an index dID∗x ∈ Nx such that (−,dID∗x ) /∈ STID∗x and adds (ID,dID∗x )
to STID∗x . Let RI
∗ = (RI∗ID0 , . . . ,RI
∗
IDℓ∗−1) ⊆ N be the revoked index set of R
∗ at the time T ∗ and SI∗ =
(SI∗ID1 , . . . ,SI
∗
IDℓ∗−1) be the non-revoked index set at the time T ∗ such that SI∗IDx =Nx \RI∗IDx .
Setup: B submits ID∗ℓ∗ and T ∗ to BHIBE and receives PPHIBE . It also submits SI∗ID∗0 to BPKBE and receives
PPPKBE . B first chooses random exponents θID∗0 , . . . , θID∗ℓ∗−1 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets α = a,βε = βID0 =
b,{βIDi = b+ ˆβIDi}1≤i≤ℓ∗−1,{γID∗x = θID∗x −∑ j∈SIID∗x aN+1− j}0≤x≤ℓ∗−1 and publishes the public parameters
PP as
PP =
(
PPHIBE , PPPKBE , Ω = e
(
e(gα1 ,g
αN
1 ),g
b
1
)
= gα
N+1βε
3
)
.
Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries.
If this is a private key query for an identity IDℓ = (I1, . . . , Iℓ), then B proceeds as follows: Note that SKIDℓ =
({dℓ,LSKℓ}) where LSKℓ = (Kℓ,0,Kℓ,1).
• Case IDℓ−1 /∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗): In this case, it can normally generate the state STIDℓ−1 by himself. It first
normally sets STIDℓ−1 where the index dIDℓ−1 is associated with IDℓ. And, it selects a random exponent
γIDℓ . It obtains SKIDℓ by running RHIBE.GenKey(IDℓ, STIDℓ−1 ,PP).
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• Case IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗): In this case, it first retrieves a tuple (IDℓ,di) from STID∗ℓ−1 where the index
di is associated with IDℓ.
– Case IDℓ ∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boenh et al. [6].
Next, it selects a random exponent rℓ ∈ Zp and creates a private key SKIDℓ as
LSKℓ =
(
Kℓ,0 = (ga
di
1 )
θ ( ∏
j∈SI∗
ga
N+1− j+di
1 )
−1 ·F1,ℓ(Iℓ)−rℓ , Kℓ,1 = g−rℓ1
)
.
– Case IDℓ /∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 : In this case, we have Iℓ 6= I
∗
ℓ from the restriction of Definition 3.2 and the
simulator can use the paritioning method of Boneh and Boyen [3]. It first selects an index
di ∈ Nℓ such that (−,di) /∈ STID∗ℓ−1 and adds (IDℓ,di) to STID∗ℓ−1 . Next, it selects a random
exponent r′ℓ ∈ Zp and creates a private key SKID by implicitly setting rℓ =−a/∆ID+ r′ℓ as
LSKℓ =
(
Kℓ,0 = g
adi θID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\{di}
g−a
N+1− j+di
1 (g
a
1)
f ′0/∆IDF1,ℓ(Iℓ)r
′
ℓ ,
Kℓ,1 = (ga1)
−1/∆IDg−r
′
ℓ
1
)
.
If this is an update key query for an identity IDℓ−1 = (I1, . . . , Iℓ−1) and a time T , then B defines a re-
voked identity set RIDℓ−1 at the time T from RLIDℓ−1 and proceeds as follows: Note that UKT,RIDℓ−1 =
(PDKℓ−1,{SIIDℓ−1 ,LUKℓ−1}) where LUKℓ−1 = (Uℓ−1,0,Uℓ−1,1,Uℓ−1,2) and PDKℓ−1 = (P0,{Pi}ℓ−1i=1 ),PL+1.
• Case T 6= T ∗: It first sets a revoked index set RIIDℓ−1 of RIDℓ−1 by using STIDℓ−1 . It also sets SIIDℓ−1 =
N1 \RIIDℓ−1 . And, it also sets SIIDℓ−1 =N1 \RIIDℓ−1 .
– Case IDℓ−1 = ID0 : In this case, the simultor can use the partitioning method of Boneh and
Boyen [3]. It selects a random exponent r′0 ∈ Zp and creates an update key UKT,R by implicitly
setting r0 =−(−∑ j∈SI∗ID0\SIID0 a
N+1− j +∑ j∈SIID0\SI∗ID0 a
N+1− j)/∆T + r′0 as
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 = gb1,
Uℓ−1,1 = (gb1)θID0
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID0\SIID0
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID0\SI∗ID0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T
H1(T )r
′
0 ,
Uℓ−1,2 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID0\SIID0
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID0\SI∗ID0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
gr
′
0
1
)
,
PDKℓ−1 =
(
P0 = 1G2 , PL+1 = 1G2
)
.
– Case IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of
Boneh and Boyen [3] to create a level update key, and the cancelation technique by using
the session key of PKBE to create a partial decryption key. It selects a random exponent
r′0 ∈ Zp and creates an update key UKT,R by implicitly setting r0 = −(−∑ j∈SI∗ID0\SIID0 a
N+1− j +
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∑ j∈SIID0\SI∗ID0 a
N+1− j)/∆T + r′0 as
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 =g
b+ ˆβIDℓ−1
1 ,
Uℓ−1,1 =(g
b+ ˆβIDℓ−1
1 )
θIDℓ−1
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
) ˆβIDℓ−1
×
(
∏
j∈SI∗IDℓ−1\SIIDℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDℓ−1\SI∗IDℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T H1(T )r′0 ,
Uℓ−1,2 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗IDℓ−1\SIIDℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIIDℓ−1\SI∗IDℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
gr
′
0
1
)
,
PDKℓ−1 =
(
P0 =
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 · e(ga1,g
aN
1 )
− ˆβID∗
ℓ−1 ,
{
Pi = gri2
}ℓ−1
i=1 , PL+1 = g
rL+1
2
)
.
– Case IDℓ−1 /∈Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) : In this case, the simulator can obtain the decryption key DKIDℓ−1,T =
(D0, . . . ,Dℓ−1,DL+1) by requesting an RHIBE decryption key query. Next, it can nomally create
an update key by running RHIBE.UpdateKey (T,RLIDℓ−1,DKIDℓ−1,T ,STIDℓ−1 ,PP).
• Case T = T ∗: For each ID ∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 , it adds (ID,T
∗) to RLID∗ℓ−1 if (ID,T
′) /∈ RLID∗ℓ−1 for any T
′ ≤ T ∗.
– Case IDℓ−1 = ID0 : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh et
al. [6]. It selects random exponent r0 ∈ Zp and creates an update key UKT,RIDℓ−1 as
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 = gb1, Uℓ−1,1 = (gb1)
θID∗
ℓ−1 ·H1(T ∗)r0 , Uℓ−1,2 = g−r01
)
,
PDKℓ−1 =
(
P0 = 1G2 , PL+1 = 1G2
)
.
– Case IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh
et al. [6]. It selects random exponents r0, . . . ,rℓ−1,rL+1 ∈ Zp and creates an update key UKT,R as
LUKℓ−1 =
(
Uℓ−1,0 = gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
1 , Uℓ−1,1 = (g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
1 )
θID∗
ℓ−1 H1(T ∗)r0 , Uℓ−1,2 = g−r01
)
,
PDKℓ−1 =
(
P0 =
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 · e(ga1,g
aN
1 )
− ˆβID∗
ℓ−1 ,
{
Pi = gri2
}ℓ−1
i=1 , PL+1 = g
rL+1
2
)
.
– Case IDℓ−1 /∈Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) : In this case, the simulator can obtain the decryption key DKIDℓ−1,T =
(D0, . . . ,Dℓ−1,DL+1) by requesting an RHIBE decryption key query. Next, it can nomally create
an update key by running RHIBE.UpdateKey (T,RLIDℓ−1,DKIDℓ−1,T ,STIDℓ−1 ,PP).
If this is a decryption key query for an identity ID = (I1, . . . , Iℓ) and a time T , then B proceeds as follows: It
requests an HIBE private key for ID and T to BHIBE and receives SKHIBE,ID,T . Next, it sets the decryption
key DKID,T = SKHIBE,ID,T .
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B chooses a random bit δ ∈ {0,1} and proceed as
follows: It requests the challenge ciphertext for ID∗ and T ∗ to BHIBE and receives CHHIBE,ID∗,T ∗ . Next, it
25
sets the challenge ciphertext CTID∗,T ∗ = (Z ·M∗δ ,CHHIBE,ID∗,T ∗).
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess δ ′ ∈ {0,1}. B outputs 0 if δ = δ ′ or 1 otherwise.
Lemma 4.2. The distribution of the above simulation is correct if Z = Z0, and the challenge ciphertext is
independent of δ in the adversary’s view if Z = Z1.
Proof. We show that the distribution of private keys is correct. In case of IDℓ ∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 and IDℓ−1 ∈
Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗), we have that the private key is correctly distributed from the setting γID∗ℓ−1 = θID∗ℓ−1−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j
as the following equation
Kℓ,0 = g
adℓ γID∗
ℓ−1
1 ·F1,ℓ(Iℓ)
−rℓ = g
adℓ (θID∗
ℓ−1
−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j)
1 = (g
adℓ
1 )
θ ( ∏
j∈SI∗
ga
N+1− j+dℓ
1 )
−1 ·F1,ℓ(Iℓ)−rℓ .
In case of IDℓ /∈ R∗ID∗ℓ−1 and IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID
∗
ℓ∗), we have that the private key is correctly distributed from
the setting γID∗ℓ−1 = θID∗ℓ−1 −∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j and rℓ =−a/∆Iℓ+ r′ℓ as the following equation
Kℓ,0 = g
αdℓγID∗
ℓ−1
1 F1,ℓ(Iℓ)
−rℓ = g
adℓθID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j+dℓ( f1,0
l
∏
i=1
f1,i,I1 [i]
)−rℓ
= g
adℓθID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\{dℓ}
g−a
N+1− j+dℓ
1 ·g
−aN+1
1
(
g f
′
0
1 g
aN ∆Iℓ
1
)a/∆Iℓ−r′ℓ
= g
adℓθID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\{dℓ}
g−a
N+1− j+dℓ
1 (g
a
1)
f ′0/∆IℓF1,ℓ(Iℓ)−r
′
ℓ,
Kℓ,1 = grℓ1 = (g
a
1)
−1/∆Iℓgr
′
ℓ
1
Next, we show that the distribution of update keys is correct. In case of IDℓ−1 = ID0 and T 6= T ∗, we
have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting βID∗0 = b, γID∗0 = θID∗0 −∑ j∈SI∗ID∗0 a
N+1− j and
r0 =−(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗0\SIID∗0 a
N+1− j +∑ j∈SIID∗0\SI∗ID∗0 a
N+1− j)/∆T + r′0 as the following equation
Uℓ−1,1 =
(
g
γID∗0
1 ∏
j∈SIID0
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗0 H1(T )r1,0 =
(
g
θID∗0
1
( ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1 ∏
j∈SIID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)b(
h1,0
t
∏
i=1
h1,i,T [i]
)r1,0
=(gb1)
θID∗0
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0\SIID∗0
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗0\SI
∗
ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)b
×
(
gh
′
0
1 g
b∆T
1
)−(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗0\SIID∗0 a
N+1− j+∑ j∈SIID∗0 \SI
∗
ID∗0
aN+1− j)/∆T+r′1,0
=(gb1)
θID∗0
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0\SIID∗0
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗0\SI
∗
ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T H1(T )r′1,0 ,
Uℓ−1,2 =g
r1,0
1 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0\SIID∗0
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗0\SI
∗
ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
g
r′1,0
1 .
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In case of IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) and T 6= T ∗, we have that the update key is correctly distributed from
the setting βIDℓ−1 = b+ ˆβIDℓ−1 , γID∗ℓ−1 = θID∗ℓ−1 −∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j and r0 = −(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j +
∑ j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j)/∆T + r′0 as the following equation
Uℓ−1,1 =
(
g
γID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SIIDℓ−1
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗
ℓ−1 H1(T )r0
=
(
g
θID∗
ℓ−1
1
( ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)b+ ˆβIDℓ−1(h1,0
t
∏
i=1
h1,i,T [i]
)r0
=(g
b+ ˆβIDℓ−1
1 )
θID∗
ℓ−1
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)b+ ˆβIDℓ−1
×
(
gh
′
0
1 g
b∆T
1
)−(−∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j+∑ j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j)/∆T+r′0
=(g
b+ ˆβIDℓ−1
1 )
θID∗
ℓ−1
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
) ˆβIDℓ−1
×
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)−h′0/∆T H1(T )r′0 ,
Uℓ−1,2 =gr01 =
(
∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
\SIID∗
ℓ−1
g−a
N+1− j
1 ∏
j∈SIID∗
ℓ−1
\SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1/∆T
gr
′
0
1 ,
P0 =g
αN+1βε
2 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 ·g
−αN+1βID∗
ℓ−1
2
=ga
N+1b
2 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 ·g
−aN+1(b+ ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
)
2
=
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 ·g
−aN+1 ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
2 =
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 · e(ga1,g
aN
1 )
− ˆβID∗
ℓ−1 .
In case of IDℓ−1 = ID0 and T = T ∗, we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting
βID∗0 = b and γID∗0 = θID∗0 −∑ j∈SI∗ID0 a
N+1− j as the following equation
Uℓ−1,1 =
(
g
γID∗0
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗0 ·H1(T ∗)r2
=
(
g
θID∗0
1
( ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)−1
· ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗0
ga
N+1− j
1
)b
H1(T ∗)r2 = (gb1)
θ H1(T ∗)r2 .
In case of IDℓ−1 ∈ Prefix(ID∗ℓ∗) and T = T ∗, we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the
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setting βε = b, βID∗ℓ−1 = b+ ˆβID∗ℓ−1 and γID∗ℓ−1 = θID∗ℓ−1 −∑ j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
aN+1− j as the following equation
Uℓ−1,1 =
(
g
γID∗
ℓ−1
1 ∏
j∈SI∗ID∗
ℓ−1
gα
N+1− j
1
)βID∗
ℓ−1 H1(T )rˆ0 = (g
θID∗
ℓ−1
1 )
b+ ˆβID∗
ℓ−1 H1(T )rˆ0
= (gb1 ·g
ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
1 )
θID∗
ℓ−1 H1(T ∗)rˆ0 , Uℓ−1,2 = g
βID∗
ℓ−1
1 = g
b
1 ·g
ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
1 ,
P0 = g
αN+1βε
2 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 ·g
−αN+1βID∗
ℓ−1
2 = g
aN+1b
2 ·
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 ·g
−aN+1(b+ ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
)
2
=
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T )r0 ·g
−aN+1 ˆβID∗
ℓ−1
2 =
ℓ−1
∏
i=1
F2,i(Ii)ri ·H(T)r0 · e(ga1,g
aN
1 )
− ˆβID∗
ℓ−1 .
Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A’s view since Z1 is
a random element in G3. This completes our proof.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we first proposed an RHIBE scheme via history-preserving updates with O(ℓ) number of
private key elements and update key elements by combining the BB-HIBE scheme and the BGW-PKBE
scheme. Next, we proposed another RHIBE scheme via history-free updates that reduces the number of
private key elements from O(ℓ) to O(1). An interesting open problem is to build an adaptive secure RHIBE
scheme with O(ℓ) number of private key elements and update key elements. Another one is to construct
an RHIBE scheme with O(ℓ) number of private key elements and update key elements that can handle
exponential number of users in the system.
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